Compassionate Violence?

On the Ethical Implications of Tantric Buddhist Ritual

By David B. Gray

Rice University

Buddhism has typically been portrayed, by both insider advocates and outside observers, as a peaceful religion, one which condemns violence and seeks rather to cultivate, internally, states of mental calm and clarity, and externally, a compassionate mode of engagement with others. This portrayal is supported by the fact that most Buddhist traditions emphasize the cultivation of compassion and loving-kindness as indispensable aids to spiritual development. Yet despite this important focus, violence has not been completely repudiated within many Buddhist schools of thought. Rather, it is left open as a possible mode of action, albeit an exceptional one, to be used by exceptional beings under exceptional circumstances. This caveat supported the development of an ethical double standard, in which behavior that is normally condemned, especially when committed by members of other religious or ethnic groups, can be seen as justifiable when committed by members of one’s own group. In this paper I will seek to examine this ethical tension as it arises in Tantric Buddhist ritual literature, a genre which challenges Buddhist self-representation as peaceful and non-violent through its description of ritual procedures that are believed to yield violent results.

Buddhists of virtually all orientation generally condemn violent behavior, and uphold instead the virtues of loving-kindness (*maitri*) and compassion (*karuṇā*), virtues
which are typically defined as powerful inclinations to seek augment the happiness and minimize the suffering of others, respectively, often at the expense of one’s own self-interest. The virtue of compassion was given a central role in Mahāyāna Buddhist soteriology, as an indispensable aid to the achievement of Buddhahood. On the popular level, the virtues of compassion and generosity were highlighted in narratives such as the Jātaka tales, which relate the Buddha’s past lives. These themes are dramatically illustrated in stories such as the bodhisattva’s self-sacrifice to feed a hungry tiger family, or in the stories of King Śibi, who sacrificed his own eyes at the request of a beggar, as well as his own flesh to save the life of a pigeon. The importance of these stories are such that they stand at the beginning of Ārya Śūra’s Jātaka collection, and they were also illustrated on a number of Buddhist monuments.

Mahāyāna Buddhists advocate universal compassion, which is nondiscriminatory and active in all contexts. This, naturally, reflects a distinctive worldview. As Charles Taylor argued, moral reactions “seem to involve claims, implicit or explicit, about the nature and status of human beings....a moral reaction is an assent to, an affirmation of, a given ontology of the human.” Mahāyāna Buddhist scholars such as Śāntideva would agree with this assessment. In their view, ordinary individuals’ moral reactions are discriminatory, and as a consequence their compassion is limited in scope, typically

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1 This portrayal is common in introductory literature on Buddhism. Some authors, such as the current Dalai Lama, have gone as far as to advance Buddhist ethics as a remedy for many of the contemporary world’s problems. See his *Ethics for the New Millennium* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1999).
2 For a translation of these tales see Peter Khoroche, *Once the Buddha was a Monkey: Ārya Śūra’s Jātakamālā* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 5-17.
3 For example, a number of jātaka narratives, including the vyāghri and sībi narratives, were illustrated in the Ajanta cave complex. For an excellent study of these illustrations and their connections to the narratives see Dieter Schlingloff, *Ajanta: Handbüch der Malereien, 1.1 Erzählende Wandmalereien, Narrative Wall-paintings, Interpretation* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag).
restricted to friends and family. This is because they adhere to a limited view of the self as an isolated and independently existent entity. Universal compassion, on the other hand, arises from the realization of selflessness and interdependent origination. On the basis of this realization, the bodhisattva, or person dedicated to the attainment of Awakening, realizes the interdependence of all living beings, a realization which necessitates compassionate moral reactions in all contexts.\(^5\)

Despite their emphasis on universal compassion, Mahāyāna Buddhists did not unequivocally rule out the practice of violent actions such as killing. Several Mahāyāna scriptures permit killing under exceptional circumstances as an exercise in expedience or “skillful means.” For example, the Upāya-kauśalya Sūtra relates what has become a famous episode in the past life of the Buddha. According to this scripture, the Buddha was previously a captain named “Greatly Compassionate,” *Mahākarunika,\(^6\) who was transporting five hundred merchants on a journey. He becomes aware that a notorious bandit is planning to attack and kill the merchants. He realizes that he has three possible courses of action, to, first, do nothing, and allow him to kill the merchants, which would be terrible for all involved. Secondly, he could warn the merchants, who would then preemptively kill the bandit. The only problem with this is that the merchants would suffer the karmic consequences of killing. Thirdly, he could kill the bandit himself, and

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\(^6\) “Greatly compassionate,” hypothetically reconstructed from the Tibetan snying rje chen po dang ldan pa (To. 82, 60b).
thereby take the karmic burden onto himself, sparing both the bandit and the merchants. He chose the latter action.\textsuperscript{7}

This story presents a situation which is clearly an ethical dilemma, especially if one believes in \textit{karma} and rebirth. It presents a scenario of “compassionate killing,” in which a spiritually advanced being, a \textit{bodhisattva}, engages in violence as a last resort. The story makes very clear that his underlying motivation is not anger or hatred, but rather compassion for all involved.\textsuperscript{8} This is plausible within the general scope of Buddhist ethics, since Buddhists have long privileged intention as the key feature for ethically evaluating an action. The Buddhist focus on intention and the introspective orientation that it implies allows considerable ethical flexibility. This focus shifts emphasis away from outward adherence to rules of morality, and promotes the view that the individual is an ethical agent engaged in what Foucault termed “ethical work,” in which one strives “not only.... to bring one’s conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behavior.”\textsuperscript{9} As an agent who is a locus of a complex and ever changing social network, the bodhisattva’s goal is to act so as to maximize benefit for all involved, but since these decisions to act are purely contextual, it is not possible to adequately formulate ethical rules that would apply to all situations.

\textsuperscript{7} For a translation of this story see Mark Tatz, \textit{The Skill in Means (Upāyakāusalya) Sūtra} (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994), 73-76.

\textsuperscript{8} For an analysis of this and related scriptural passages see Harvey 2000, 135-138.

Mahāyāna Buddhists’ equivocal attitudes toward violence persisted, and was in fact greatly heightened in the Tantras. This is in part due to the general philosophical continuity between early Mahāyāna thought and its later phase of development, which is Tantric.\(^\text{10}\) Tantric Buddhist thinkers advanced the proposal that bodhisattvas, on account of their underlying compassionate orientation, are exempt from ordinary ethical norms. An extended defense of the seemingly unethical behavior of bodhisattvas was undertaken by the great eighth century Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita. In his Tattvasiddhi, he quotes from a number of sources to support the view that bodhisattvas transcend conventional rules of morality. He claims that “As it is stated in all of the Yogatantras such as the Guhyendutilaka, ‘for the mind endowed with wisdom and expedience, there is nothing which should not be done.’”\(^\text{11}\) Here, as in the Upāyakauśalya Sūtra, the idea of expedience is advanced in defense of transgression. Śāntarakṣita continues his argument in a more philosophical bent as follows, supported by a quote from Āryadeva:

Āryadeva explained that “From the perspective of bodhisattvas, virtue and non-virtue are all conceptions.” Taken in terms of this, they attain the distinctive fruit on account of the fact that these are conceptual distinctions that result from distinguishing things in terms of merit and demerit, which are themselves conceptual constructs, and also because they are distinctions made with regard to form, etc. Thus this position must be admitted even by those who do not hold it.\(^\text{12}\)

This argument, that human ethical codes are conventional and hence lack any basis in ultimate reality, is, from the Buddhist perspective, the strongest argument that can be mustered in defense of the position that a bodhisattva must, when dictated by

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\(^\text{10}\) “Tantra” is the school of Buddhism that arose in India during the seventh century and which places great emphasis on complex systems of ritual and meditative practice, which they claim can rapidly effect Buddhahood, within a single lifetime. This school was disseminated from South Asia to East, Central and Southeast Asia from the eighth century onward.

\(^\text{11}\) Tattvasiddhi, To. 3708, rgyud ’grel vol.tsu, 27b, IASWR ms. MBB II-248, 3a.4,5.
compassion, violate these rules, for compassion is the dominant moral value in Buddhist ethics, which trumps all other considerations.

This debate was not entirely restricted to the realm of philosophical discourse, but had a serious impact on Tantric Buddhist practice. For there is a significant body of Tantric Buddhist literature that either evokes violent imagery or describes violent ritual practices. These passages are problematic even within the tradition, for while Mahāyāna Buddhists saw violence as ethically justified under certain exceptional situations, Buddhists had a long history of resisting ritual violence, and Buddhist identity was in part defined vis-à-vis the Vedic ritual tradition that they rejected on these grounds.13 As a result, violence in Tantric Buddhist ritual literature frequently inspired fascinating commentatorial responses. I will look at two genres of Buddhist ritual literature. First, I will explore the violent imagery found in Buddhist sādhana or meditation manuals, with a particular focus on the commentatorial treatment of this imagery. Second, I will examine the debates concerning the justifiable use of violence, in this case, ritual violence, centering around the abhicārahoma or fire sacrifice performed in order to kill one’s foe or foes.

My first example concerns the deity Heruka, a prominent Tantric Buddhist deity. Like many other fierce Tantric deities, and his ferocity is mirrored in the myths of his violent origins. These accounts relate that he and his retinue are nirmāṇakāya emanations of the cosmic Buddha Mahāvajradhara and his retinue, who manifested in Śaiva garb in order to subdue the Hindu deity Bhairava and his retinue. This

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12 My trans. of the Tattvasiddhi from the Tib. at To. 3708, 29b as well as the Sans. in IASWR ms. MBB II-248, 5b.5-6a.2.
itself is portrayed as a paradigmatic act of compassionate violence, for the Hindu deities and their followers are accused in the myths of being guilty of numerous acts of violence. These accounts were written in reaction to the Hindu myths in the Purāṇas that demonize Buddhists. These myths relate the descent of deities such as Viṣṇu and Śiva into the world to combat the pāśaṇḍas or heretics, a loose category which often was explicitly applied to Buddhists. The Buddhist myths, in turn, demonize Hindus, portraying them as heretical on account of their alleged penchant for violence. Ironically, the “solution” to this problem is their violent subjugation.

I will not dwell on these myths any further here, as I have analyzed several of them at length in my forthcoming book. Instead, I would like to turn to a justification for Heruka’s fierce persona authored by an important Tantric Buddhist scholar, Buddhajñāna. Active during the late eighth and early ninth centuries, he is the author of numerous works, and also the founder of an important school of Tantric exegesis. He composed two works on the fierce deity Heruka, a sādhana and an autocommentary on it. His Śrīherukasādhana contains the following passage: “[Visualize] a vajra generated

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13 This issue is discussed in greater depth in my forthcoming paper “Eating the Heart of the Brahmin: Representations of Alterity and the Formation of Identity in Tantric Buddhist Discourse.”
16 Regarding his dates and oeuvre, see Ronald Davidson, Indian Esoteric Buddhism: A Social History of the Tantric Movement (New York: Columbia UP, 2002), 309-316.
17 The term vajra, literally “thunderbolt” or “diamond,” here refers to a Tantric Buddhist ritual scepter which symbolizes expediency or skillful means. It thus is the weapon of choice of fierce deities.
from [the seed-syllable] hriḥ, which blazes like a destroying fire. From that the
Compassionate Fierce One is born, the Great Terrifier (mahābhairava) bearing a skull
garland.”18 Buddhajñāna comments on this as follows:

If ferocity (krodha) is a virtue which arises in the compassionate mind, yet as is it
[one of the] subsidiary afflicting (upakleśa) classified with anger, how can it be
called “compassionate ferocity?” It is generated preceded by compassion, just as
the son is of the mother. Thus, it is prescribed as a method of anger which is an
effect proceeding from the cause which is compassion, and it is like fire. As for
the other, it arises from the cause of the “me” and the “mine,” and it is an effect
which manifests in having an afflicted mind, in the manner of good and bad
fortune.19 It is on account of this that it is said that it “blazes like a destroying
fire,” for it manifests the appearance of that. He is a “Terrifier” (bhairava)
because he terrifies Mahādeva and so forth. Since he is unusually terrifying he is
“Great” (mahābhairava).20

Here Buddhajñāna puts forward what would become a very popular interpretation in
Tantric Buddhist circles. Although Buddhist deities such as Heruka appear in fierce
forms, their ferocity is not believed to be a manifestation of mental afflicting such as
anger. Rather, Buddhists claim that these deities’ ferocity is rooted in compassion, and
hold that their fierce demeanor is an exercise in skillful means. This accords with their
emphasis on intention in ethically evaluating an action.

Perhaps due to the success of this argument, the vast majority of Tantric Buddhist
commentators from the ninth century onward did not seem to feel that such ferocity is
worthy of commentary. There were, however, exceptions to this pattern. One of the
most notable exceptions occurs in the writings of Atiśa Dipaṅkarajñāna, a Bengali

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18 Buddhajñāna, Śriherukasādhanā To. 1857, DT rgyud ‘grel vol. di, 43a.
19 Buddhajñāna’s text here reads sva sti dang a ri sha lta bu’o (45a). I read a ri sha as an attempt to
transliterate ārīṣṭa, “ill-omen,” “bad luck,” “misfortune,” etc., which is the opposite of svasti. His point
here may be that an afflicted mind, due to failure to apprehend causality, is obsessed with good and bad
fortune, and experiences the ups and downs of “fortune,” which is really, in the Buddhist view, the
unanticipated and misunderstood effects of past actions.
20 Buddhajñāna, Śriherukasādhanavṛtti To. 1858, DT rgyud ‘grel vol. di, 45a.
Tantric Buddhist scholar who was active at Vikramaśila monastery in Eastern India, in what is now West Bengal, during the early eleventh century. It occurs in his Abhisamayavibhaṅga, a commentary on the important Cakrasamvara sādhanā attributed to the great saint Lūipa. When he comes to the fierce deities who guard the periphery of the maṇḍala, Atiśa makes a unique commentatorial move. While all of the other ten commentators on this text are content to merely describe these deities’ appearances, Atiśa reflects upon the ethical implications of these deities, whose role is to crush any interlopers into the maṇḍala’s sacred precincts. This fact alone confirms that this text was in fact written by Atiśa, who was a subtle thinker deeply concerned about ethical issues, and troubled by the apparent breaches of ethical norms in the Tantric praxis of his day. He begins with a quote from the Yoginīsāmcāra Tantra, the text on which Lūipa’s sādhanā is based: “Krodha Vijaya and so forth make effort for the sake of beings by the expedience of diverse disciplines, at the doors and in the quarters.” In Atiśa’s commentary we learn that the expression “expedience of diverse disciplines” is a euphemism for violent action, a euphemism that is quite ancient, since the concept of expediency was long offered as an apology for violence in Buddhist literature. What the guardians really do, Atiśa informs us, is “plant their spikes in order to expel all of the

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22 Lūipa, Śrībhagavat-abhisamaya, To. 1427, rgyud ‘grel vol. wa, 186b-193a.
23 The seven additional commentaries occur at To. 1465, 1492, 1498, 1509, 1510, 3795, and 3796. Three additional ones occur at PTT #4659, 4660, and 4661.
24 My trans. of Yoginīsāmcāra Tantra 17.4c-5b, as ed. in J. Pandey, Yoginīsāmcāratantram (Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1998, 148). This text is quoted in Atiśa in his Abhisamayavibhaṅga (AV) To. 1490, DT rgyud ‘grel vol zha, 188a.
demons, and utter om gha gha etc. Then they beat them with mallets.\textsuperscript{25} He continues with the following justification for this behavior:

Thus, in order to separate and analyze them with the indestructible characteristic and action of discerning wisdom (prajñā), and also isolate and burn them, there are, [respectively,] the vajra fence, the fierce fence, and the wall of fire. It is not that they strike out of an upsurge of anger, however.\textsuperscript{26}

Atiśa agrees with Buddhajñāna that anger is not the underlying motivation for the instances of violence imagined or implied in Buddhist meditation or ritual. He thus goes on to explore the reasoning underlying the claim that violence is acceptable under certain conditions. He wrote that “Thinking that conventionally there is no one injured nor an injurer is to revile [the doctrine of] cause and effect.” Here he evokes and rejects the famous claim advanced in the second chapter of the Bhagavad-Gītā, namely, that ultimately there is no killer or killed, since the true basis of the self, the ātman, is indestructible. But if Atiśa rejects this argument in favor of justifiable violence, how then does he legitimate such actions? Even the demons who haunt the periphery of the maṇḍala, after all, would seem to be sentient beings, and are thus deserving of the universal compassion that Mahāyāna Buddhism advocates. He continues his explanation as follows:

Although there is no lack of causality conventionally, it is not, however a matter of getting rid of them through the application of actions motivated by anger, because conventionally one also has the armour of love, etc., and, ultimately, the knowledge of birthlessness.

Why is that? Conventionally all things are none other than mind alone. Thus the very wavering astray of mind is Māra\textsuperscript{27} and the demons. Furthermore, insofar as

\textsuperscript{25} AV 188a.
\textsuperscript{26} AV 188a.
\textsuperscript{27} Māra, lit. “Death,” is the “evil one” of Buddhist literature, who takes delight in tempting sages and in disrupting their meditations. See Trevor Ling, Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil, (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1962).
the mind wavers astray into the path which leads to the wrong way, to just that extent can Māra operate. So it is said. The very straying of mind from its medicine is Māra and so forth.\textsuperscript{28}

Atiśa here invokes the \textit{Yogācāra} theory of the baselessness of imputations of independent existence to phenomenal reality in order to deny the external reality of the demons who are the targets of the \textit{sādhana}’s ritual violence. This is an old defense, invoked, for example, in the seventh century \textit{Mahāvairocana-abhisambodhi Tantra}, which states: “Obstacles arise from your own mind, due to previous indulgence in avarice. In order to destroy their cause I teach \textit{bodhicitta}.”\textsuperscript{29} This text then lists a number of violent rites for destroying demonic obstacles. This argument seems a bit inconsistent; if the demons do not in fact exist as independent entities, what need is there to insist that their destruction should be performed with a compassionate motivation?

Atiśa then turns to an examination of authoritative statements on this subject. He continues, arguing:

Now, it is well known to everyone that there is no one more knowledgeable than the Buddha. Did he explain this in a Tantra? While this is so, there are no literal passages \[to this effect\]. Thus it says in the \textit{Abhidhānottara}, “There is no killing nor non-killing by those who have controlled their minds. Yet those whose minds are bound kill one another.” And also “Wearing the armour of love is the armour of the \textit{dharma} of compassion. Those who have the sword of wisdom eliminate the demons of the afflictions. The wheel of authority\textsuperscript{30} is the great protection, and with the stake one succeeds without demonic interference. With these rites of defense, awakening is bestowed upon the adept, and he is caused to take up the authority of the Lord, and wherever he abides is seen as being free of all demonic interference.”

\textsuperscript{28} AV 188a,b.
\textsuperscript{29} Trans. in Stephen Hodge, \textit{The Mahā-Vairocana-Abhisambodhi Tantra with Buddhaguhya’s Commentary} (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 153.
\textsuperscript{30} The \textit{ādiḥsthānacakra}, also known as the \textit{samayacakra}, is the outermost wheel in the Cakrasamvara maṇḍala containing the fierce goddesses who guard the maṇḍala’s periphery.
One who is not like this, who has a wrong understanding of that authority, who is headed toward lower modes of existence through the actuality of evil actions, who is bound by the noose of the afflictions, etc., cycling like a water-wheel, and who lacks distinction—such a person is not a yogin who abides on this path.\footnote{AV 188b.}

Atiśa finds solace in the formula propounded in the \textit{Abhidhānottara}, namely that “killing” is a conventional phenomenon that the awakened transcend, although he carefully accords this passage provisional rather than ultimate status, since he is uncomfortable with the denial of causality that such passages imply. This justifies violence by those who have controlled their minds, and are thus not motivated by the passions, but rather by the cool calculus of compassion, which calls for violence as a defensive strategy, that is, as a way preventing evil doers from committing greater acts of violence. This denial of the reality of violence differs somewhat from the earlier Mahāyāna Buddhist view, in which the negative ethical impact of violence is not denied, but rather embraced as a manifestation of the \textit{bodhisattva}’s self-sacrifice.

The Tantric Buddhist tendency to downplay the negative consequences of necessary acts of violence is rooted in the imperatives of praxis. Buddhists did not just abstractly debate the possible use of violence for defensive purposes. They actually created ritual techniques that were thought to effect the “pacification” or outright elimination of evildoers who threatened the teachings, institutions, and well-being of Buddhists. Probably the best known and most widely practiced of these was the \textit{abhicāra-homa}, or the rite of fire sacrifice deployed for destructive purposes. The \textit{abhicāra-homa} is a subset of a larger class of \textit{homa} rituals employing a sacrificial fire. This ritual system is a modified Buddhist version of the archaic Indian \textit{homa} rite which
formed the cornerstone of the Vedic ritual system. The Buddhist *homa* rite could serve multiple purposes, and could be deployed for positive as well as violent purposes.\(^{32}\)

This rite occurs in the early strata of esoteric Buddhist literature, such as the *Mahāvairocana-abhisambodhi Tantra*. This text makes a brief reference to it, namely “When subduing hated foes, one should employ the fierce fire.”\(^{33}\) This inspired the following commentary by Śubhakarasimha and Yixing, writing during the early eighth century:

Regarding the “fierce” (*krodha*, 怒) [fire sacrifice], fire becomes the basis that gives rise to things. This basis is the mind. It is said that there are conditions that compel one to do hostile things in order to subdue people. It is from within the mind that anger arises. This anger is not like the anger of worldly people. It is said that the true nature of anger manifests from a mind of great compassion. Moreover, it is generated as an expedience in order to subjugate evil teachings.\(^{34}\)

These authors agree with Buddhajñāna in rooting this practice in compassion. Although the *abhicārahoma* is intended for the purpose of killing one’s foe or foes, it is to be employed as an expedience for the purpose of “subjugating evil teachings,” that is, eliminating those who propound them.

That the performance of hostile rites was considered legitimate by some Indian Buddhists is indicated by Bhavyakirti, a scholar active during the early tenth century. He


\(^{33}\) T.848.18.43a29: 降伏怨對時。當以忿怒火。 Note that the Tibetan reading is slightly different, reading “The Fierce Fire is famed for all violent procedures.” (To. 494, rgyud 'bum vol. tha, 227b: drag shul spyad pa thams cad la // khro bo'i me ni rab tu bsgrags); cf. Hodge, 2003, 382.

\(^{34}\) T.39.1796.782a.3-8.
was also an abbot of the Vikramaśila monastery. He makes this clear in his commentary on chapter thirty-one of Cakrasamvara Tantra, which describes a fierce homa rite for the purpose of subduing a rival kingdom, as follows:

Then the vajra-born destroyer of all is recalled with the great meat. This is the dreadful destruction of all the cruel ones. Should one thus perform without hesitation the rites of eating, fire sacrifice and sacrificial cakes with the meats of dogs and pigs, and even of chickens which have copper colored crests, everything without exception will be achieved, and all kingdoms will be subdued.

The rite is thus doubly violent in both its end and means, since its performance requires the meat of several animals, including possibly a human being. Bhavyakirti acknowledges the sinful nature of these actions, but attempts to resolve it by claiming an ethical double standard, as follows:

Regarding dog, etc., some claim that killing them, except in cases where their appointed time of death has arrived, is to undertake a great sin, that desire to perform this sinful action is difficult to alleviate, and that these are cases of oneself committing murder. The ten non-virtuous actions, however, are not necessarily downfalls for those who have realized the reality of selflessness. Moreover, the Śrī Guhyasamāja states “Bereft of gnosis they undertake the ten virtues and the paths of action.” And it is explained that “Enduring my own suffering risking myself for the suffering of others, I proceed to the Avīci Hell.” Being endowed with great compassion and having realized the reality of selflessness, one will not fall even if one practices the ten non-virtuous actions for the sake of beings. According to Śantaraksita, bodhisattvas endowed with expedience and wisdom, including those who are on the paths of the ten non-virtuous actions, will achieve distinctive results. With regard to the question of this distinctive group

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35 Regarding the dating and vocation of Bhavyakirti, see section 1.3 of the introduction to my forthcoming book.
36 The Sanskrit here reads sarveśām nāśanaṃ, which is translated here. The Tibetan translations read “terrifier,” jigs byed (PM 234b, SL 124a).
37 My trans. from my ed. of Cakrasamvara Tantra 31.1a-3b.
38 The term “great meat,” mahāmāṃsa, is commonly interpreted in the Tantras as a euphemism for human flesh.
39 These are a traditional Buddhist list of sins, the first of which is killing.
41 Here I read bsdar as bsdos.
42 Avīci is the lowest hell in the Buddhist cosmology, into which fall the greatest sinners.
giving rise to distinctive results, one cannot say that this is not the case, as these [ethical] conventions all arise from mental distinctions.\textsuperscript{43}

Furthermore, it is well known that if those who are not yogins consume poison without understanding the reality of poison, they experience the cause of death. But yogins who understand the reality of poison rely on the excellent cause of alchemy and transform it to ambrosia. What objection could there be to these ten non-virtues giving rise to distinctive results for those who have a mentality that unifies emptiness and compassion, who have no regard for their own happiness, and who are extremely apprehensive about the suffering of others? Rudra destroyed the Triple City, and the army of Viṣṇu demolished eighteen massive armies,\textsuperscript{44} and even naked [ascetics] destroy subtle life forms through a mere touch....[There was also] a sage (ṛṣi) whose mind burned with the fire of wrath, who incinerated like wood the king’s army with the fire of malediction. These heretics, because they kill, give rise to the suffering of the hells and so forth. This is because their non-virtue arises from previous tenacious attachment to the ‘me’ and the ‘mine.’\textsuperscript{45}

Overall, this is a fascinating example of what J. Z. Smith calls “rationalization,” an attempt to accommodate the discrepancy between Buddhists’ non-violent self-identity and the violent elements present in their scriptures and rituals.\textsuperscript{46} Bhavyakirti employs several strategies to reconcile these, including the deployment of both rational and mythic discourse. Like Śāntarakṣita, he advances the ethical double standard that allows bodhisattvas to engage in behavior that is otherwise prohibited. He also evokes the old idea that they do so as an act of compassionate self-sacrifice, even though willingly taking on the evil karma of violent actions might plunge them into the Avīci hell, the lowest hell of “no respite” into which the worst sinners fall.

His apology then proceeds with a series of examples from Hindu mythology in which deities or sages are portrayed as engaging in violence. He specifically refers to the

\textsuperscript{43} Bhavyakirti here summarizes Śāntarakṣita’s argument in his Tattvasiddhi, which is translated above.
\textsuperscript{44} The Tibetan trans. here reads a kṣo hi, no doubt a transcription of aksauhini, an army consisting of 21,870 elephants, 21,870 chariots, 65,610 horse, and 109,350 foot soldiers (Monier-Williams 2002:4 col. 1)
\textsuperscript{45} Bhavyakirti, Śricakrasamvarapāñjikā-śūramanojñā-nāma, To. 1405, D rgyud ‘grel vol. ma, 29b-30a.
myth of the destruction of the Triple City (tripuräntaka), several versions of which were powerful anti-Buddhist polemics.47 This, along with his reference to the myths of Viṣṇu’s military exploits in several of his avatāras, indicates that Bhavyakirti was familiar with this genre of Hindu mythic literature, which, just like the legend of Mahākaruṇika, could be interpreted as a justification for necessary violence.48 Moreover, his statement that “even naked [ascetics] destroy subtle life forms through a mere touch,” implying that violence is an inescapable element of worldly existence, evokes the argument propounded in chapter three of the Bhagavad Gītā, namely, that action is intrinsic to all living beings,49 but he goes further than the Gīta, using this as a justification for violence. Yet Bhavyakirti condemns the violence allegedly performed by non-Buddhists, even as he defends the use of ritual violence by Buddhists. He thus evokes the ethical double standard in a highly sectarian manner, failing to observe that some Hindus might justify exemplary violence in the same way that he does. This is no doubt due to the common Buddhist tendency to depict non-Buddhists as immoral, despite, or perhaps because of, their similarity to one’s own position. He justifies this by making the typical Buddhist claim that the practice of morality is necessarily rooted in a realization of selflessness, but this is a divisive claim which non-Buddhists would not accept. This also likely reflects the contentious religious atmosphere in Northern India at

49 See Bhagavad Gītā 3.5.
this time, an atmosphere which was in part conditioned by the political divisiveness of this era.50

What were the historical consequences of this permissive attitude toward ritual violence, provided that it is performed by the right person in the right circumstances? There is no doubt that this ethically troubling position hindered the dissemination of Tantric Buddhism. Many Buddhists found texts that advocated violent rituals such as the abhicāra-homa offensive. Only a fraction of the texts that contained these practices were successfully transmitted to East Asia, and those that were tend to be bowdlerized, with the offensive passages ambiguously translated or eliminated entirely.51 In cases where these texts were accurately translated, they were subject to emendation to rationalize their transgressive character. An example of this occurs in the Song dynastic Chinese translation of the Vajrabhairava Tantra.52 This text, like the Tibetan translation,53 contains a chapter on homa fire-sacrifice that appears to be less bowdlerized than other Chinese translations of the Tantras, and it does describe the transgressive abhicāra-homa rite. Undoubtedly for this reason, the translator(s) appended to the beginning of the text the following prologue, which is not found in the Tibetan version:

Then Vajrabhairava addressed the Buddha saying, “As I now desire to benefit sentient beings, I will teach the method of all magical powers. I beg that you, Buddha, compassionately bestow fearlessness upon me.”

50 Ronald Davidson has argued that this was a major factor influencing the development of Tantric Buddhism. See Davidson 2002, esp. chs. 2-4.
51 See Willemens’ comments regarding this in his introduction to his The Chinese Hevajratantra: The Scriptural Text of the Ritual of the Great King of the Teaching, the Adamantine One with Great Compassion and Knowledge of the Void (Belgium: Uitgeverij Peeters, 1983).
52 That is, the 佛說妙吉祥瑜伽大教金剛陪囉縛輪觀成就儀軌經. T.1242.21.203b-207b. This title could be reconstructed as *buddhabhāṣita-Śrīvajrabhairava-mahāyogatantra-cakradhyāna-siddhikalpa-sūtra.
53 The corresponding Tibetan text is not, as the titles suggest, the Śrīvajrabhairava-tantrarāja-siddhikalpa (Toh. 470), but is rather the Śrīvajrabhairava-nāma-tantrarāja (Toh. 468). Both texts are translated into English, on the basis of the Tibetan and Mongolian trans., in Siklós 1996.
The Buddha replied, “Excellent, Bhairava! Teach widely in order to benefit the licentious.” Then Bhairava, receiving the command of the Buddha, manifested to the host of humans and gods a very fierce demeanor, and taught all of the method of the magical powers (siddhi).

[He proclaimed,] “If there are wizards (vidyādhara) who wish to practice this teaching of mine, they should first give rise to an attitude of [wishing] great benefit for all sentient beings. Then, seeking to receive consecration (abhiṣeka) from the Vajra Master (vajrācārya) they will attain consecration. [Then they can] make use of the various methods in the text to fix the magical powers.

“Moreover, a wizard may see sentient beings of evil karma who rebel against the king’s mandate, throw off all restraint in rebellion and are not filial to their parents, harbor hateful intentions toward the master, destroy the Three Jewels and defame the Mahāyāna and Secret Teachings, or who disrespectfully transgress their commitments (samaya), and passionately and perversely give rise to peril and harm. With regard to this sort of person, one should make use of this teaching to subdue him, and even give instruction to those who repent. Yet should a wizard harbor in his or her own mind childish envy toward ordinary, passionate beings or virtuous people, and perversely use this teaching to distress them, when he arrives at the karmic consequence of this he will enter into the Howling Hell (raurava).”

This apology, with its recourse to the Confucian virtues of loyalty and filiality, clearly represents an attempt to reposition the potentially subversive rituals described in the text, by presenting them as tools to be compassionately deployed in the service of empire, against its foes. It thus sends a stern warning to those un-filial and disloyal practitioners who might be tempted to use them against the state. This particular attempt to reposition the text and the practices it described, while superfluously successful in that outright censorship was avoided, apparently failed, in that the practice tradition associated with the text was evidently not successfully transmitted to China, perhaps in part due to anxiety concerning the dissemination of these destructive ritual technologies, which

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54 My trans. from T.1242.21.203b.9-25.
could be employed by the state, but also against it. Destructive fire sacrifices were in fact frequently deployed in East Asia in conjunction with military activities. In addition to their deployment by Tibetans, which will be discussed below, hostile fire sacrifices were also deployed in medieval Japan as a method of dealing with military foes.55

A similar process was at work in the case of Tibet during the imperial period, when Buddhism was first transmitted there. During the imperial period the Tibetan kings were understandably apprehensive about the abhicāra rites, which often include ritual procedures to subdue or destroy the king, that are included in many of the tantras, and which occur abundantly in the “Mahāyoga” or “Anuttarayoga” Tantras such as the Vajrabhairava and Cakrasamvara Tantras. While we do not know what Tantras were actually censured during the imperial period, we do know that some were selectively translated, with transgressive passages excluded. For example, the absence of passages describing the fierce abhicārahoma rite in the early dynastic translation of the Sarvadurgatipariśodhana Tantra was evidently due to censorship.56 This supported by the Tibetan scholar and historian Bu-ston, who reported that:

Tibet’s king and high ranking ministers observed that dishonest sentient beings of the future would not understand the profound intentional import [of the texts], and would apprehend the symbols literally. Without even the slightest unification of expedience and wisdom, they would be educated in the mantras without being bound to even a single commitment concerning [what behaviors are] to be avoided or cultivated. These practitioners of the immodest, deviant, semblant Tantras of the heretics would denigrate the Teachings of the Buddha and engage

56 Leonard van der Kuij reports that “Grags-pa rgyal-mtshan refers to some earlier exegetes who opined that these two passages were lacking in the SDP [Sarvadurgatipariśodhana Tantra] because earlier kings and ministers had prohibited their translation out of fear of antagonistic tantric practitioners. He, however, is of the view that they were indeed translated....but were never included in the authoritative translation.” See his “Notes Apropos of the Transmission of the Sarvadurgatipariśodhanatntra in Tibet,” Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 16 (1992), 116, insert mine.
in a method of destroying both self and other. Hence it was decided through royal proclamation that there was to be no translation of the Mahāyoga Tantras except when permission is granted.\(^57\)

These Tantras were eventually translated into Tibetan and openly practiced in Tibet, but not until after the fall of the Tibetan empire, which also was the end of the centralized power necessary to enforce censorship. While later rulers such as Lha bLa-ma Ye-shes-’od and his descendents in Western Tibet attempted to control the translation and dissemination of the new influx of transgressive Tantric texts,\(^58\) their efforts were ineffective, no doubt because they failed to achieve hegemony over a politically fragmented Tibet. Moreover, their fears concerning the misuse of violent rituals were apparently justified. Chinese sources indicate that several centuries later, the Mongols employed Tibetan lamas for magical assistance in battle. This assistance entailed performing rites focusing on fierce deities such as Mahākāla for the purpose of destroying their enemies.\(^59\)

The Tibetans, however, were not unequivocal advocates of ritual violence. While King Lha bLa-ma Ye-shes-’od could not prevent the spread of Tantric texts and practices, he was so concerned about the ethical implications of these that he went to great expense and effort to bring Atiśa to Tibet, largely on account of Atiśa’s reputation as an ethically


sophisticated Buddhist scholar. Doing so in no way advanced a program of censorship—Atiśa was a an accomplished Tantrika himself, and aided in the translation of several texts, including the transgressive *Abhidhānottara Tantra*. But he was nonetheless deeply concerned with the ethical implications of Tantric practice, and this was a major influence on the thinking of his key disciple, ‘Brom-ston, who founded the bKa’-gdams-pa school that highlighted the moral precepts. And while this school did not reject the study and practice of the Tantras, it sought to carefully regulate them.

The legacy of the school that resulted inherited the mantle of the bKa’-gdams-pa, the dGe-lugs, whose name literally means “The Virtuous System,” is somewhat mixed. The founder of the dGe-lugs school, Tsongkhapa, was famed for his efforts to reform Buddhist practice. Yet he was strangely unconcerned about the ritual violence described in the Tantras. For example, in commenting upon the *abhicāra-homa* in the *Cakrasamvara Tantra*, he does not even attempt to defend such practices. He comments on the opening of the chapter as follows:

> Then, after the thirtieth chapter, I will explain the thirty-first, that is, I will explain undeceptively the vajra-born fire sacrifice with the great meat, i.e., human meat, etc., which destroys the life-force of all the cruel ones. It is also explained that these [rites] are performed with the gnosis that is inseparable from the vajra, that is, by the concentration of the body of Vajradhara which is generated from that. This human flesh fire sacrifice is described as the dreadful, i.e., powerful, destroyer of the life-force of all the cruel ones. Is human flesh the sole requisite? In the same manner as human flesh, the cruel ones are destroyed even if one offers fierce fire sacrifices (*homa*) and sacrificial cakes (*bali*) to the deity with the meats of dogs and pigs, and even of chickens which have copper [colored] crests. However, here the power of human flesh is

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60 Regarding the history of this invitation see Chattopadhyaya 1981, 279-366.

61 This concern went so far that the dka’-dams-pa, in collecting and disseminating the works of their founder, Atiśa, tended to downplay his Tantric works and highlight his Sūtric and philosophical works. None of the former are contained in the “Key Texts” category translated by Richard Sherburne in his misnamed work, *The Complete Works of Atiśa* (New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 2000).
greater. In order to undertake these three, one is primarily engaged in left-handed conduct. If in doing this one does so having realized the natural clear light without consideration of whether this is proper or not, one will attain all of the great powers (mahāsiddhi) such as the sword and so forth, and the state of Buddhahood where there are no remaining powers [to be attained], and you will attain all kingdoms as a universal (cakravartin) or regional (dikpāla) monarch. It is also held that these fleshes are not produced by killing them oneself.

The juxtaposition of Bhavyakirti’s and Tsongkhapa’s commentaries on this same text from the Cakrasamvara Tantra is striking. While Bhavyakirti’s commentary is purely apologetic, Tsongkhapa appears completely unconcerned with the ethical implications of this text. In fact, his vision of Tantric practice here is quite amoral. If we take this commentary out of context, we would be forced to conclude that, for Tsongkhapa, Buddhahood might be attained through violence, rather than through compassion. But this would be an unfair conclusion, one that could only be supported by ignoring Tsongkhapa’s large body of work of ethical issues. His lack of concern here is understandable in light of the different social contexts in which these commentaries were written. Both Bhavyakirti and Tsongkhapa were influential figures in important Buddhist institutions. Tsongkhapa was a respected scholar and institution builder, while Bhavyakirti was an abbot of the important Vikramaśila monastery. However, during the early tenth century when Bhavyakirti was active, the status of transgressive Tantric texts such as the Cakrasamvara Tantra as authentic Buddhist scripture was a hotly debated issue, and significant numbers of Buddhists considered it heretical on account of its

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62 This refers to the three “rites of eating, fire sacrifice and sacrificial cakes” mentioned in the root text.
64 For example, he wrote extensively on these topics in his famous lam rim chen mo. See, for example, volume one of the translation of this work, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2000).
descriptions of ritual violence, as Bhavyakirti indicated elsewhere in his commentary. His defense here is thus understandable. However, by the time Tsongkhapa was writing in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries in Tibet, the authenticity of Tantras such as this one was no longer contested.

Another factor was undoubtedly the institutionalization of Tantric studies in Tibet. The treatise in which this commentary occurs, his *Illumination of the Hidden Import*, was not intended for public dissemination. Texts such as this were traditionally restricted to an elite audience of very well educated monks in the dGe-lugs tradition. This does seem to imply that the ethical double standard was institutionalized in the dGe-lugs school, which emphasizes conventional Mahāyāna ethics for the laity and lower clergy, and restricts the texts and practices which challenge this to the higher clergy, who are presumed to possess the hermeneutical tools to properly understand them. There is also some evidence suggesting that advanced monks are believed to be exempt from conventional moral precepts under certain exceptional circumstances, on account of their superior training. But here we should also note the last line of his commentary. In my experience, Tibetan Buddhists do not employ the flesh of living beings in any of the rituals that call for these, but use instead carefully constructed simacrum, usually

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65 For a discussion of this see my forthcoming article, “Eating the Heart of the Brahmin: Representations of Alterity and the Formation of Identity in Tantric Buddhist Discourse.”
67 For example, there appears to be some indications that certain exemplary monks were believed to be suitable for karmamudrā sexual yogic practices, despite the fact that such practices would entail a violation of their pratimokṣa vows. See Glenn Mullin, *Tsongkhapa’s Six Yogas of Naropa* (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 1996), 70-71, 249 n. 17.
elaborate *bali* or *gtorma* offering cakes that are designed to simulate these substances. But in so far as these rites are thus performed, this does not mitigate their ethical impact, given the fact that their intended result is murder, which is ethically problematic given the Buddhist ethical focus on intention.

I would like to conclude by noting an obvious point. Buddhists are not alone in struggling with the issue of the ethical implications of violence. While some of the texts that I have included herein did and still may seem repugnant to some Buddhists, as disgraceful examples of a fall from the Buddhist ideal of universal compassion, they reflect attempts by Buddhists to navigate the complex and sometimes violent field of social practice. Tantric Buddhist ritual, in its violent manifestations, appears to be a response to a certain sense of discrepancy, namely the discrepancy between the hierarchical cosmos as imagined by Tantric Buddhists, which naturally privileges the Tantric Buddhist world view, and the lived social world of these Buddhists, a context in which their world view was challenged from both within and without. From a certain perspective, the history of religions is a history of the very human attempts to reconcile the high and sometimes contradictory dictates of religious ideals with the messy realities of political life. Tantric Buddhists sought to reconcile these spheres in a rather ingenious way, but like all attempts of this sort, it was not perfect, but problematic, due to the very fact that the ethical double standard that it creates implicitly supports a social hierarchy, which, like all such hierarchies, was potentially hegemonic in practice.

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68 These are typically composed of a mixture of roasted barley flour and butter. For the fierce rites, they are often dyed red, and shaped so as to simulate the body parts of a sacrificial animal or person.